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1. Introduction 
Searle's "primary aim" in his Intentionality1 "is to develop a theory ofIntention-
ality" (1983, vii). In what follows we shall discuss some main points of his 
concept(s) of Intentionality: (1) The (re-)construction of Intentionality; (2) 
The Intentionality of perception. Its genesis and causality; (3) Some remarks 
concerning the background of Searle's Intentionality program. 
The concepts of Intentionality. 
In his Minds, Brains and Science, Searle remarks with respect to the social 
sciences that "What we want from the social sciences and what we get from 
the social sciences at their best are theories of pure and applied Intentionality". 
(Searle 1984, 85)2. What Searle is saying in the passage just quoted, namely 
his differentiation of Intentionality into pure and applied holds, in our opin-
ion, for his "primary aim", the pure theory of Intentionality and for his 
secondary aim, the applied versions ofIntentionality3. 
2. (Re-)construction of pure4 Intentionality 
Searle's approach to the problem of Intentionality started via his former 
studies on speech acts (1969; 1975; 1979). Speech acts are taken as a type 
* Our special thanks to Josef H. Roll for his technical advice and helpful comments. 
I A forerunner to this book is Searle (1979a). 
2 Our emphasis. 
3 Searle proposes "the explanation of human behavior [ ... ] in a subsequent study". (Op.cit., 
x) 
4 'This is to show not only the objective fact that there are subjective mental,rtates (in the world), 
but also and especially, that (most) mental states "have logical properties and are 
representations in their purest [ ... ] form." (Searle in Heyer/Miinch 1984, 30) They are 
intentions but do not intend. 
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of human actions (applied intentional forms) and seen as an extension and 
a derived (not intrinsic, not pure) form of Intentionality. Their capacity 
to represent objects and states of affairs is fundamentally based on the non-
derived, intrinsic representational capacities of the mind's Intentionality. 
So, "the basic assumption" is that "the philosophy of language is a 
branch of the philosophy of mind" (1983, vii), and by investigating the 
nature of (some) mental states Searle wants to provide a foundation for 
(1) his theorems on philosophy of language; (2) his way towards the 
philosophy of mind. He goes, as it were, backwards from a (dependent) 
"branch" to its roots in order to show "the more general [more biologically 
fundamental] capacity of the mind to relate the organism to the world 
[ ... ] [and] how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality". (Op.cit., 
vii) 
Here we are confronted with two more naturalistic holistic assumptions: 
that there is an organism, or an organic-unity-structure of the "mind and 
brain" and that the mind is in fact the subjective side of the physical brain 
or at least causally related to the brain. (Searle goes on towards the end 
of his book in chapter 10 "to demythologize the whole [Cartesian] mind-
body problem a bit" (op.cit., 265) by explaining the interrelatedness of 
mind and brain: "mental states are as real as any other biological phenom-
ena" (op.cit., 264), they "are caused by biological phenomena and in turn 
cause other biological phenomena" (op.cit.), and "there really are such 
things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something 
else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition" 5. 
In our first chapter we try to describe Searle's approach to the elements, 
the internal structure and the interrelatedness of Intentional states. Let us 
see how Searle proceeds in his "hard work [ ... ] not only in trying to get 
each part right, but also in making all the parts cohere in the general 
conception". (Op.cit., x) 
2.1. The Intentionality of mental states 
In an interview Searle said that "a point of his book [Intentionality] was in 
a certain sense to establish a short 'taxonomy' of the different aspects of 
Intentionality". (Heyer/Miinch 1984, 26) These aspects are directedness; 
representation; meaning, belief, and desire. 
2.1.1. Directedness 
In accordance with "a long philosophical tradition" (Searle does not 
specify) Intentionality is formulated as "that property of many mental 
5 Our emphasis. 
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states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and 
states of affairs in the world." (1983, 1) 
Searle "dissociates" himself from "certain features of the tradition" 
(op.cit.). He points out what he finds to be insufficient or misleading in 
it and contrasts it with his use of the term: 
Searle distinguishes those mental states which have Intentionality, which 
are intentionally directed towards something and which are characteristically 
accompanied by beliefs or desires on the one hand from the other mental 
states (e.g. being anxious) which lack the momentum of directedness. 
Searle holds that Intentionality is not identical with consciousness. For 
conscious states such as being anxious are not necessarily directed towards 
something (not directed to something other than themselves); and there 
are intentional states such as unconscious beliefs (beliefs one normally 
does not think about) which nevertheless refer to something. So Searle 
separates the "class of conscious states and the class of Intentional mental 
states" (op.cit., 3) from one another (though they may overlap they do 
not include each other, they are not coextensive). 
Intentionality (capitalized) is an Intentional state or event, exclusively. 
Searle's use of Intentionality (as just one form of intending in general) is 
restricted to directedness. An Intentional state does not "act" ("acts are things 
one does", e.g. speech acts, - even "in your head", e.g. mathematics), 
Intentionality does "not intend anything". 
2.1.2. Representation 
Intentional states always are directed towards something, even if there is no 
object one could direct one's attention to. So the question is that of 
the Intentional relationship of directedness, or, how Intentionality can be 
explained "without using metaphors like 'directed"'. (Op.cit., 4) 
A solution to this is proposed in explaining the representational character 
of Intentional states. Yet "the notion of representation is conveniently 
vague. [ ... ] There is probably no more abused term in the history of 
philosophy than 'representation'" (op.cit., 11), Searle remarks. So "we 
could in principle dispense with the terms 'representation' and 'represent' 
altogether in favor of [ ... ] other notions, since there is nothing ontological 
about the use of 'representation'. It is just shorthand for [ the] constellation 
of logical notions borrowed from the theory of speech acts." (Op.cit., 12)6 
Searle uses his speech act model, the various types of speech acts, to 
explicate Intentionality in terms of language. Since specch acts have a 
derived form of Intentionality, their representational character is a derived 
6 Our emphasis. 
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(not intrinsic) one. Language is logically dependent on Intentionality. Only 
for heuristic and pedagogical reasons, Searle emphasizes, is he explaining 
Intentionality in terms of language. He makes use of the "prior knowledge" 
of the logic of speech acts to translate it into the logic of Intentional states 
in order to show "how and in what sense Intentional states are also 
representations" (op.cit., 5). The observation of the structure of speech 
acts (the distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force; 
the different directions of fit; the parallel between the performance of an 
illocutionary act and the corresponding Intentional state; the notion of 
"conditions of satisfaction") "carries over to Intentional states." (Op.cit.) 
Let us illustrate these similarities, analogies, connections (cf. op.cit., 
4-22). 
speech acts consist in 
propositional content (p) and 
illocutionary force (F) which 
presents the propos. cont. (F (p» 
directions of fit (d.oj.) of speech acts 
assertive word (F)-> to world (p) 
speech acts (F): -> d.o.f. 
(true or false changed unchanged 
statements etc.) 
match the world faulty unfaulty 
or not 
directive sp.acts: -> world -> to word d.o.f. 
(orders etc.) changed unchanged 
(obeyed or faulty not faulty 
disobeyed) 
commissive: world -> to word d.o.f. 
speech acts -> 
(promises etc.) 
(kept or broken) faulty not faulty 
null cases: null d.o.f. 
(apologies etc.) 
Intentional states consist in 
representative content (r) and 
psychological mode (S) which 
presents the repr. cont. (S (r» 
directions of fit (d.oj.) of 
Intentional states 
beliefs (S): -> mind (S) -> to world (r) 
d.o.f. (S(r» 
(true or false) changeable unchanged 
desires: -> world -> to mind 
d.o.f. 
(fulfilled or desired not true or 
not) false 
intentions: -> world -> to mind 
d.o.f. 




Words (F) and minds (S) have a logical responsibility of fitting (in all 
d.o.f.). 
World is the world of speech acts (p) and Int. states (r) (in all d.o.f.), 
not an ontological (de re) world. 
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(speech act) 
performance of an illocutionary act 
with a propositional content 
(direction of fit) 
(assertive) statement that p 
(directive) order to do A 
(commissive) promise to do A 
(null d.o.f.) apology 
presupposes a propos. content 
(speech act) 
(assertive) statement true 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff c.o.s. fulfilled 
[statement false (d.o.f. unsatisfied) 
without its C.O.s. being fulfilled] 
assertive statement pretended 
(as-if-d.o.f.) suspended c.o.s.] 
(directive) order obeyed 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled 
(commissive) promise kept 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled 
For all d.o.f.-speech acts: 
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Internal parallelism 











in case of d.of 
(intentional state) 
expr. of certain corresponding 
Intentional states 
with that propositional content 
(constitutes sincerity condition) 
expression of belief that p 
expression of desire to do A 
expression of intention to do A 
expression of sorrow 
contains belief 
(intentional state) 
expressed bel ief true 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fullfilled 
expressed desire fulfilled 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled 
expressed Intention carried out 
(d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled 
their c.o.s. obtain iff Intentional states have c.o.s. (logical primacy of Inten-
tionality).Assertive statements about Intentional states (and Intentional states), 
being representations, are representations of representations (representation 
without c.o.s.; the proposition taken to be true). 
7 Cf. ibid., 18f. It is misleading to say that an intentional state is a two-term relation 
between, say, a belief and a proposition and to say that a statement is a two-term relation 
between a speaker and a proposition. A proposition is not the object of a statement or 
belief but rather its content. A statement is identical with the proposition stated; a belief 
is identical with the proposition believed. There is no sense in a basic distinction between 
so-called de re and de dicto intentional states. 
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An assertive statement about a propositional content of an Intentional state 
is a presentation of representation (truth conditions neglected). 
For all d.o.f.-Intentional states: 
they are representations/have a not separable propositional content (in dif-
ferent modes) of their c.o.s.; the content determines their respective c.o.s.; 
their c.o.s. in turn depend on (are determined by) (1) a representational 
Network of other Intentional states; they are embedded in a whole Network 
of other Intentional states; they thus cannot be described exhaustively, but 
only as logical consequences of an initial Intentional state. Intentional states 
are, in general, parts of the Network; they have their c.o.s. relative to their 
position in the Network of representation. (2) The determination of the c.o.s. 
of an Intentional state works only against a nonrepresentational "Background 
of practices and of preintentional assumptions" ("nonrepresentational mental 
capacities") (cf. op.cit., 19 and 21). One consequence is: the c.o.s. are not 
independently determined, but depend on a Network and a Background. 
For all not d.o.f.-Intentional states: 
they are not representations / have no specified propositional contents, 
presuppose the propositional content, have no 'Intentionally inexistent 
objects'S other than themselves / have no d.o.f., no c.o.s. 
Sorrows, joy, e.g. have/are a psychological mode but no d.o.f. 
2.1.3. Meanings, beliefs, desires 
Meanings, beliefs and desires are not primary forms, but are etiolated by 
more primordial (biological) experiences in perceiving and doing. So the 
conjunction hypothesis marks the "beginning of a general theory of 
Intentionality". (Op.cit., 35) 
Meaning states cannot stay on their own. They are not proper Intentional 
states. They apply to sentences and speech acts only, i.e. they exist iff a 
distinction is made between the content and the form of externalization. To 
ask for the meaning is to ask for an Intentional content that goes with the 
form of utterance. So meaning implies an overt action (which in turn 
converts the utterance act into an illocutionary act and therelry imposes 
Intentionality on the utterance). 
Believing and desiring: Searle tries by analyzing belief and desire (the 
degrees of conviction/cognition and the degrees of desire/volition, respec-
tively) to give an account for a hypothesis of a conjunction analysis of 
these Intentional states. He distinguishes (1) beliefs and desires as Intentions 
H In contrast to F. Brentano, cf. ibid., 14, 18. It is essential, according to Searle, to 
distinguish in these cases between the content (i.e. a proposition) of an Intentional state -
which obtains, though it does not specify - and the object (= ordinary object; there are 
only ordinary objects, no Meinongian entities, for Searle) of an Intentional state - which 
is not there and, consequently a statement in these cases is not about anything. (Cf. ibid., 
17.) 
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with whole propositions as contents from (2) beliefs and desires which invol-
ve Intentional states with no whole proposition as contents, yet their Inten-
tionality being in part explainable in terms of beliefs and desires, and (3) 
from those Intentional states which are nonpropositional cases with no d.o.f. 
3. Intentionality of perception - its genesis and its internal causality 
After the discussion of the logic of Intentionality of perception of (some) 
mental states Searle goes on to consider the nature of the biologically 
primary Intentional states: perceiving (perceptual experience) and doing 
(Intentional action) and their causal relatedness to the world. 
So, in this chapter, we have a genetic description of some primary 
Intentional states. Perceiving (or perceptual experience) and doing have 
their Intentional causation "in their conditions of satisfaction" or truth 
conditions. (Cf. op.cit., 36) 
Visual experience (Searle is dealing with visual experience most of the 
time) is but one example of a perceptual experience, or "a component of 
any visual perception". (Op.cit., 38) Visual experience has Intentionality 
because it has its c.o.s. analogously as Intentional states have Intentionality. 
(An experience is always an experience of something and, by this fact, an 
experience of Intentionality). The Intentional content of the visual experi-
ence determines its c.o.s. because of its intrinsic Intentionality. 
There are some analogies and some disanalogies between Intentional 
representations (such as belief) and Intentional perceptions/presentations: 
Intentionality of representation 
content: a whole proposition 
or a part-proposition 
explainable in terms of 
belief and desire 
has a propositional 
content: 
a visual experience 
that ... is the case 
d.o.f.: mind to world 
false not false 
representations 
not ontological/ontologically neutral 





not nec. conscious Intentional states 
analogies 
disanalogies 
Intentionality of visual experience 
content: the existence of a whole 
proposition or state of affairs 
required as its c.o.s. 
having a visual experience 
to see that ... 
d.o.f.: mind to world 
misled not misled 
perceptions 
ontological (requires an object) 
directly, immediately presented 
caused by its c.o.s. 
d.o.f.: mind to world 
conscious mental states/events 
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For a visual experience: 
its visual (perceptual) Intentional content requires an object/a state of 
affairs as the cause of that specific visual experience to be satisfied. 
It is the realization of causation of the Intentional content. 
Its visual Intentional content is causally self-referential (independent 
of a verbal representation). 
It "is an Intentional and causal transaction between mind and world" 
(op.cit., 49). 
Its d.o.f. is mind to world; its direction of causation is world to mind; 
and both directions are causally interrelated. 
representation 
of the object itself, not just 
of an aspect of the object 
not of different contents 
further disanalogies 
(but by different Intentional 
modes) 
the different aspects being the 
objects 
visual perception 
of aspects of a situation, 
of fixed aspects by the 
way it is perceived 
of different contents 
of "aspects under aspects" 
(op.cit., 52) 
Searle hereafter discusses some complications and interrelations: (1) A 
representative Network and Background affect the content of a perceived 
Network and Background (cf. op.cit., 55). (2) The content of representa-
tion is constant and so it is inconsistent with the differently appearing 
visual content (the representation "overrides" the visual experience). (3) 
There are cases where the content of a representation and a content of 
perceptual experience are consistent, i.e. have the same c.o.s. 
Searle's "naive" (noninferential) realism in his account of causal visual 
perception (against the representative theory and against phenomenalism) 
can be stated as follows: 
(1) With respect to the elements of visual perception (perceiver, visual experience, object); 
where the perceiver or the mind, respectively, is directed by his visual experience 
to its existing, material objective states of affairs, or the world. 
So visual experience is to be understood as a causal transaction, as a d.o.f., 
which has (but is not) an Intentional content; the "vehicle" (op.cit., 61) 
or transactor of the Intentional content is the visual perception. 
The object is the Intentional object (of the existing material world) being 
the c.o.s. for the d.o.f.. The experienced object or world is neither a 
private sense datum, nor an impression, nor a representation, it is argued. 
(2) With respect to the truth conditions/c.o.s.; in a sentence x sees y (in front 
of x), x is to be understood in the context of its Network with other 
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Intentional states and its nonrepresentative Background; seeing is to be 
understood as the visual experience, the "basis" (cf. op.cit., 73) of a self-
referential event (x just sees y; he does not infer the existence ofy) with 
the following properties: (a) It has certain c.o.s.: the fact that there is ay; 
the fact causes regularlY a corresponding visual experience. The causation 
as part of the natural world is external to the other c.o.s.; and causation 
is as causal relation part of the Intentional content; and causation is 
experienced as caused; and causation as a relation is eo ipso transitive. (b) It 
has certain phenomenalistic properties; its c.o.s. are determined regularly 
by the visual experience. (c) Its c.o.s. are satisfied by the fact that there is 
an actual y, causing the visual experience, which embraces the intentional 
content. The Intentional content in turn is not isolated, nor is it indepen-
dent; it is internally, holistically as well as indexically related to other 
present Intentional contents (the elements of the Network) and to present 
nonrepresentative capacities (the Background). 
Now there is the question whether there is a close connection (involve-
ment) between Intentions (Intentional actions) and what one can tell 
people to do, i.e. whether there is an involvement or a logical connection in 
ordering people to do something and their being able to do it Intentionally. 
On the one hand one has to consider whether or not a word is a verb 
which denotes an action, i.e. whether or not there is a symmetry relation 
of Intention to action. (Op.cit., 81-3) 
Searle goes on "to develop an account of the relations between Intention 
and action that will show how the relations fit into the general theory of 
Intentionality". (Op.cit., 83) One has to look for "those Intentions that 
are formed prior to actions and those that are not". (Op.cit., 84) This is 
to distinguish between (1) cases where the agent has the Intention to 
perform the action prior to the performance of the action itself (prior 
Intention), e.g. somebody knows what he is about to do because he already 
has the deliberate, conscious Intention to perform it; and (2) cases, where 
an Intention was in action without there being a prior, conscious Intention, 
cases in which one just performs things or just acts. (Cf. op. cit., 84) All 
Intentional actions have included Intentions in action; not all Intentional 
actions have prior Intentions. (Cf. op.cit., 85) Prior Intentions as well as 
Intentions in action are causally self-referential (like perceptual experi-
ences). So, their c.o.s. require that the Intentional states themselves stand 
in certain causal relations to the rest of their c.o.s. (Cf. op.cit.) 
To explain the causal self-referential character of Intentions and the role of 
action one has to look back to what has been said about speech acts (vide 
above diagram of assertive, directive, commissive speech acts). The self-
reference does not imply an infinite regress in a directive speech act, for 
instance. One orders somebody to do something and thereby one is 
creating a reason for him to perform the act in question and the directive 
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will be obeyed iff somebody performs that act for exactly that, and no 
other reason. (Cf. op.cit., 86) 
These are connections between prior Intentions and Intentions in action. 
There are some more analogies between perceptional experiences that are 
characteristic of actions, and actions "J ust as there are characteristic 
experiences of seeing a table, so [ ... ] there are characteristic experiences of 
raising your arm". (Op.cit., 87) In each case there are two components 
(1) the experience of raising your arm and (2) the physical movement of 
your arm. The two components are interrelated (both have Intentionality 
and have c.o.s.). (Op.cit., 87) 
Intentionality of the visual experience of something is a mind-to-world 
d.o.f. Its direction of causation is the direction of the object (world) to the 
visual experience (mind). (Cf. op.cit., 88) 
In the case of the experience of acting there is a world-to-mind d.o.f. The 
experience of acting is a presentation of its C.O.s. Action is, like perception, 
a causal and Intentional transaction between mind and world. (Cf. op.cit., 88) 
There is always an experience of acting present as a component of acting. 
One has to take care to distinguish these kinds of Intentional actions from 
bodily movements that do not have Intentional components. (Cf. op.cit., 
89) 
Any conscious Intentional action implies the experience of performing 
that action, and that experience has an Intentional content. A conscious 
experience of acting involves a consciousness of the c.o.s. of that experi-
ence. (Cf. op.cit., 90) The Intentional content of the Intention in action and 
the experience of acting are identical. The experience of acting merely is the 
Intention in action. (Cf. op.cit., 91) 
Unintentional actions have to be distinguished carefully from Intentional 
actions because they are said to be actions that are Intentional under one 
description but not Intentional under another description. (Cf. op.cit., 101) 
It is proposed that we count an action as unintentional under those 
aspects which, though not Intended, are within the field of possibility of 
Intentional actions of the agent as seen from our point of view. (Cf. op.cit., 
102) 
Intentionality and causality are internally related terms as put forward 
by Searle for achieving his aim of "Intentionalizing causality" and, thereby, 
naturalizing Intentionality. (Cf. op.cit., 112; cf. also Brand 1984) 
Intentional causation, as it is explainable and describable as having both 
its d.o.f. and c.o.s., differs from the standard Humean theory of causation. 
(Cf. op.cit., 119) 
(1) By knowing the Intentional causality without further observations; the 
justification or c.o.s. does not depend on other observations. 
(2) Intentional causation of events is independent of any relevant causal 
laws. (Cf. op.cit., 120) 
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(3) There is a logical or internal relation between cause and effect because 
there is always an Intentional content that is causally related to its c.o.s. 
As cause and effect themselves are logically related, we are provided with 
logically related descriptions of cause and effect. (Cf. op.cit., 121) 
Thus the statements of Intentional causation are, in general, intensional. 
(Cf. op.cit., 123) The notion of Intentional causation is that we directfy perceptualfy 
experience the causation (the causal relation that one thing makes another 
thing happen). 
Searle points out against "the view of several philosophers from Reid 
to von Wright" (op.cit., 124), (a) that not by observing our actions but 
by (in) performing our actions do we experience ("become aware of') 
Intentional causation ; (b) that we are directly aware of causation (the 
"causal nexus") in action as much as in perception; the causal nexus is 
internal to the content of experience, not to its object; (c) that one 
experienced event is a causal and logical presentation or representation of 
another event. Both events constitute a compositive event. Causes and 
events are internally related this way, and we, who know it, are aware of 
the relation by our Intentional experience (which is part of the Intentional 
content). The Intentional content "must be a causally relevant aspect and 
it must exemplify a plan able regularity". (Op.cit., 140) 
By these explanations of causalities, Searle shows how, in his sight, 
some traditional problems of the philosophy of perception, namely its 
causality, and its mind-body(world)-relation are to be solved. 
4. Some remarks with respect to Husserl, and Brentano 
Searle's book on Intentionality is a systematical, intrinsic, logical account, 
a convincing one, too, if one neglects the contributions to the topic done 
by others, to the same extent as Searle neglects them. He knows about 
the historical background yet does not care too much about it: in his 
acknowledgements he lists "helpful" commentators, but it does not seem 
that he openly has made much use of them. Instead he partly "ignores" 
(at least he says so) and partly ridicules (as it might seem) "all this 
distinguished past" in favour of "the relentless pursuit of my own investi-
gations". (Op.cit., ix) 
This is a frank confession which has to be taken seriously. At least we 
did so in our re-description of some main features (in order to make their 
interrelations explicit to ourselves, following Searle's maxime). So we do 
not discuss Searle's concept of Intentionality in its details, but rather 
S earle' s background, as Holenstein (1985) did. There are some "backgrounds" 
("nonrepresentative" but present in a double meaning to Searle, not only 
in the "distinguished past" but also in the present time, e.g. Chisholm, 
Intentionality of perception 221 
who provided several fundamental studies in the last three decades from 
his (1955(6) onwards), that are left aside nearly undiscussed, though known 
to Searle. 
Searle quite often tells us that he is dissociating himself from certain 
features of the philosophical tradition. He explicitly owes some debts to 
Frege and Wittgenstein, but one wonders about the fact that he hardly 
mentions other authors who are known indeed for their major contribu-
tions to the topic ofIntentionality, e.g. Husserl, and, before him, Brentano. 
(Both of them he critically mentions only one time each). Asked about 
Brentano's contributions to intentionality and the contributions of "a 
famous philosophical school, which tries to elucidate the intentional struc-
ture of the consciousness" Searle laconically answers: "Yes, I have heard 
of them; they are called phenomenologists." (Heyer(Miinch 1984, 25) 
In the following part, we shall stress some aspects of both philosophers 
or schools in order to question whether Searle is right in "dissociating" 
himself from that "traditional literature I really do not know well enough". 
(Heyer(Miinch, ibid.) 
(1) Concerning the term of directedness it is obvious that Searle had 
taken the idea of aboutness from both, Brentano especially, and Husserl. 
Brentano for instance says that psychological states have an "intentional 
(and supposedly a mental) inexistence of an object", that they are the 
"relation towards a content",and that they are a "direction towards an 
object without there being (necessarily) a real object" (1874). 9 Husserl 
(1901) 10 discusses and develops these topics: The "mental" or "immanent" 
object. "Each intentional experience [Erlebnis] has not only a relation to 
objects but is itself an object of certain intentional experiences". He 
criticizes "the containment of one mental content in the other", introduces 
the term "immanent objectity" (immanente Gegenstiindlichkeit) as a denomina-
tion of an essential property of intentional experiences, and rediscovers 
the synonym scholastic expressions intentional or mental inexistence of an 
object. Husserl points out (1) that the intentional experiences have the 
property to refer to presented objects in different ways; they do it in the 
sense of intention. (2) An object is meant to be intended in a psychological 
mode; i.e. there are some certain experiences present that have an intentional 
character. (3) There are not two things cop resent in the mental state; there 
is not the experienced thing and, in addition to it, the intentional act which 
is directed towards the thing; there are not two things in the sense of part 
and whole but there is onfy one thing present: the intentional experience. (4) 
9 Cf. Brentano 1874,21923, 124f., 127, 137, 140, 172f., 180. (Our translation) Cf. also 1982, 
132, 144, 146ff. 
10 Cf. 1901, V. Logische Untersuchung, §§ 8-11,16-7. 
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Hussed suggests it would be better to avoid the improper speech of 
"immanent objects"; instead one should notice the experience of a psycho-
logical state and our relation towards it. Translated into proper speech 
one has to say - instead of having an intentional object of my presenta-
tion - : In my "I", being a concrete complexity of experiences, there is 
a specific presentation of a certain experience really present. (5) Husserl goes 
on to discuss the differences of descriptive and intentional contents. By 
"contents" he means the object of an intentional state, its material, and 
its intentional essence (Wesen). 
This seems to be the part of the directedness of Intentionality Searle . 
has in mind. It has to be added that it is Brentano's, too (cf. 1911): there 
is no peculiar ontic "intentional inexistence" as Husserl, and Searle, ascribe 
to Brentano. 11 
A further step in the interpretation of directedness, as just pointed out, 
is that in directedness we have an "immanent objective" in different modes: 
"In love something is beloved, in hate something is hated". The mental 
state has a content different from itself. Hearing has a content different 
from hearing as hearing. 
If there is an undirected feeling, that state is a self-referential one. In a 
mental state like this (Seade's null d.o.f. cases) both the content and the 
object of Intentionality are "melted together in one 'subject object'" .12 
A mental state is a "real state". It exists "intentionally and really". It is 
the expression of a natural point of view towards the world with its 
"background" (natiirliche Einstellung; Weltglauben). In the sense of a reflec-
tion it has a conscious relation to or of the world (Bewufltseinsbezogenheit der 
Welt ).13 
(2) Concerning (re-) presentation and perception, too, Searle follows the feature 
of Brentano'sjHusserl's notion of presentation (Vorstellung). In a presenta-
tion there is always something presented. Something is "in us", a "thought 
of something", a "concomitant presentation together with its object" or 
a "melting of a presentation with its object" (Cf. Brentano 1874, 114, 116, 
121, 183, 196). Husserl differentiates that "there is no difference [ ... ] 
between an experienced [erlebt] conscious content and the experience 
[Erlebnis] itself. The sensed [Empfundenes] e.g. is nothing else than the 
sensing [Empfindung]." If one has an experience of an "object other than 
11 Brentano, op.cit., vo!. 1I., 21924, appendix, esp. pp. 213ff. Cf. also 1966. For the analysis 
of intentional mental states and procedures how to get on with them, cf. 1982, passim. 
12 Brentano, op.cit., vo!. 1., 125-27; cf. 137, 172 f., 182 f., 196; cf. 1982, 129-32; Hussed 
1901, 1I11, 372; 1950, II, 195; cf. also, 108f. 
13 Hussed 1950, I, 57-9, 62 f.; 1962, 63, 289; 1954,25; 1901, V. Logische Untersuchung, 
§§ 2-3, 17, 20. 
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itself' then "the object is not experienced [erlebt] l ... ] but perceived 
[wahrgenommen]." (1901, II, 352)14 
There might be some question about (1) the nomenclature of (re-) 
presentation and perception and (2) the status of representation and 
perception as to whether they are of an ontological character or not. In 
one sense a presentation is in a logical connection with other Intentional 
states, on the other hand it is a presupposition (a "fundamental" mental 
state) for other Intentional states, and it is itself a reality. That is, a 
perception can function both as a mental and as an ontological presupposi-
tion. A judgment implies a representation and not vice versa. A representa-
tion is a presupposition or "motive" of a judgment (logical version); or: 
A (re-)presenter is a presupposition of a judger (ontological version). 
There is no judgment without a representation in Brentano. A judgment 
is "motivated" (1) if it is "caused immediately" by the "content of the (re-) 
presentation" (Vorstellungsmaterie) and (2) if the "causation is noticed" (cf. 
Brentano 1956, 128f., 168; 1966, 219f.). 
(3) Concerning Searle's to against "mental acts" in Brentano it must be said 
that though Brentano is known for the Aktpsychologie attributed to him 
and though he often speaks of acts and mental actions (psychische Tatigkeiten) 
he explicitly tells us what he means by "acts", namely "mental appearan-
ces", "mental states", "mental phenomena", "mental elements", and in it 
something is present and presented. (Cf. Brentano 1874, 19, 27, 31, 107, 
114) There is no primary activity in Brentano's acts as Searle suggests. 
The same holds for Husserl's "modes of inactuality" in his Ideen of 1950 
(cf. op.cit., § 35) concerning the Erlebnisstrom, part of which is a passive 
experience. "Acts" in Husserl are experiences and thus are motivated by 
its contents. There are no "acts" in the sense Searle uses "acts" as doings. 
There is really a crucial point in defining acts, actions, acting and the 
like. 15 
(4) Concerning the Network and the Background, Husserl speaks (cf. 
1954) of horizon intentionality (Horizont-Intentionalitat), of a stream of 
consciousness or parts of that stream (Erlebnisstrom und Teile davon) which 
have Intentional Backgrounds. This Background is not a conscious mental 
state of incomplete experiences. It is a Background which is not particularly 
intended. It is a sort of undefined periphery as an antecedent undefined 
possibility and necessity. In Brentano (1874) there is discussion of the 
Network-interconnection of psychical states, such that one psychological 
mode is evoked by another one; and that there is a dependence of mental 
states on physical ones; and that the "physiological preconditions and 
14 Husserl 1901, Illl, 352. (Our translation) 
15 Cf. e.g. Husserl 1901, V. Logische Untersuchung, § 30. 
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coconditions" of a mental state have to be considered; and that the 
dependence of physiological events on one another has to be taken into 
account16, and that there are mental events with a Background that goes 
unnoticed or is not conscious. 17 
These remarks should he sufficient. It is not our intention to write the 
missing footnotes to Searle's book, but rather to recall some underlying 
standards of Intentionality, that cannot be discovered anew. 18 This does 
not affect, however, Searle's merits concerning the reinforced discussion 
of the mental. 
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